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THE EMPEROR QUESTION AGAIN : 
lSSN 0454 2134 
ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1945 & 1989 
Roger Buckley 
'It is a matter for sincere regret that you should have 
suffered from great loss of life and property caused by this 
war. 
’＂＇ 
The death of the Showa Emperor marked the end of an era m 
Anglo-Japanese relations. This paper attempts briefly to examine 
changing British perceptions of the Japanese monarchy at the time of 
Japan’s surrender m the summer of 1945 and dunng the months of his 
long illness and eventual death on 7 January 1989"' 
The Emperor question was one of the comparatively few issues of 
post surrender policy that the British government discussed dunng the 
second world war The need to first defeat Fascism in Europe and then 
contribute to what Japanese historians are now terming the 'Japanese 
Anglo-American War' left litle time for Bntish officials to draw up 
det剖iledplans for the occupation of Japan, yet some discussion is 
known to have taken place both in London and through Br江田h
diplomats stationed in Washington DC The key figure m these 
preparations and soundings with the Americans was Sir George 
Sansom, whose knowledge of things Japanese earned him considerable 
respect in the United States and to which he would return after 
retirement as professor at Columbia. 
Central to much of these British commentaries was a wish to 
safeguard the Japanese monarchy It was a reckoning that was based 
for both the Foreign Office and State Department on the lack of viable 
alternatives. Japan after its defeat would inevitably be a turbulent and 
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potentially revolutionary place; it followed that the lmpenal line might 
provide an anchor for what was seen by the small number of Japan 
speciahsts within Whitehall as a society where deference and trad1t10n 
could perhaps be deployed to prevent radicahsm. Critics of this 
bureaucratic concept of a conservative Japan were appalled They 
wanted no truck with Hirohito and knew the popularity of their position 
among public opinion within Britain. Servicemen in Burma and the 
families of British POWs from the Malayan campaign saw the Emperor 
as both the symbol of Japanese aggression and an active leader in 
Japan’s bid to dommate the Asian Pac1f1c region. 
Anger at the Emperor and his nation cut across economic and social 
divides.'" The fal of Singapore and the maltreatment of British and 
Commonwealth soldiers and civihans combmed to leave Japan facmg 
strident demands for revenge. The British people might know !ttle of 
the complexities of Japanese politics but they identified the Emperor as 
the master mind behind the war and Japanese atrocities. Bntish 
propaganda, of course, had encouraged such views.“Vengeance, bloody 
vengeance”had been the message m wartime newsreels seen 
throughout Britam and overseas. Hirohito, Mussohm and Hitler were 
convenient shorthand expressions for uniting Bntish society and 
mtensifying the war effort. 
Yet on 29 July 1945 when the newly appointed British Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin met Secretary Forrestal at Potsdam it was 
already apparent that even the Labour Party’s leadmg trades unionist 
figure had no time for any further reference to Emperor “bashmg” 
James Forrestal recorded in his diary: 
‘I asked him a question about the Emperor m Japan, 
whether he thought we ought to insist on destruction of the 
Emperor concept along with the surrender He hesitated and 
said this quest10n would reqmre a bit of thinking, but he 
was inclined to feel there was no sense in destroying the 
instrument through which one might have to deal m order to 
effectively control Japan ’開
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Bevin's remarks strongly suggest that the mfluence of the Foreign 
Office on the British government's handling of the fate of the Emperor 
was crucial. Pre-war specialists on Japan, such as Sansom, had 
deployed their knowledge of the nal!on to stress the necessity of 
retaining the Emperor withm a modified political system. Undoubtedly 
the Emperor’s behaviour m the days preceeding Japan’s belated 
surrender played into the hands of Bntam’s Japanologists. It was, said a 
junior Foreign Office official who would later end his career as 
ambassador to Tokyo, vital to reckon with the Emperor’s past and 
present role. Arthur de la Mare of the Far Eastern department minuted 
in December 1945 that 'the Emperor 1s the greatest asset we hold in 
the control of Japan. It was not the atomic bomb which caused the 
Japanese surrender; 1t was the Emperor’s rescript ordering them to do 
，向so山
What stil has to be explained, however, 1s the ease with which the 
Foreign Office won the day and was able so comfortably to see off the 
hostility of much of British opmion on the future of the Emperor The 
answer probably hes in the circumstances that faced British society 
following VJ-Day. Relief at the sudden and unexpectedly early 
surrender of Imperial Japan was quickly followed by the disturbing 
knowledge that Bntam would have to face a seemingly lengthy penod 
of economic dislocation and deprivation. Concern for jobs and housing 
were the twin priorities of the new Labour cabinet and much of 
Britain. There was no holiday Rationing, shortages, conscripl!on and 
queues continued as if the war had not yet ended. As George Orwell 
told his American readers of Pa吋zsanReview in May 1946; 
二、，；ehave as yet had no sohd advantage from the change 
of the Government, and people in general are aware of this 
For anyone outside the armed forces, life since the armistice 
has been physically as unpleasant as it was durmg the war, 
perhaps more so, because the effects of certain shortages 
are cumulative.’＇＂ 
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In the months after Japan’s capitulation Bntish polttics simply had 
too large an agenda to find much space for occupied Japan. If there 
was to be a Brave New World under Clement Attlee it would be one 
concerned first and foremost with domestic reconstruction and only if 
there was any surplus energy left over would issues of international 
affa1rs begm to intrude Japan undoubtedly benehtted from this lack of 
interest within Britam, parlicularly as a comparable movement was 
underway in Truman’s United States. General Eichelberger, the 
commander of the US’s Eighth Army stationed in Japan, was correct to 
sense that American opinion quickly lost interest in scrutm1zing events 
' lη m Japan
The preparedness of both the Attlee cabinet and the Truman 
administration to leave Japanese business to General MacArthur and 
his staff m the Dai lchi Building was most certamly a reflection of the 
lack of sustamed public attention on the Allied occupat10n of Japan.'" 
The subject of Japan became almost dull and journalists stationed in 
Tokyo began to move to Chma to cover the ensumg collapse of the 
Nationalists at the hands of Mao Tse-tung. News from Shanghai had a 
higher priority than the predictably enthusiastic press handouts from 
SCAP GHQ. While for Britam it was, as Orwell pomted out, a case 
that '[a]l who bother about politics are immersed in the day-to-day 
struggle over Tneste, Palestine, India, Egypt, the nalionalizat10n of 
stel, the American loan rehousing, the Health Service Bil, and I do 
not know what else, but no thoughtful person whom I know has any 
hopeful picture of the future.’倒
British policies for Japan were dumped accordingly into the grateful 
lap of the experts. The Allied occupation was to prove to be one of 
the rare periods in postwar British institutional history when the 
Foreign Office had virtually carte blanche to run affa1rs as it saw fit. 
The diplomats made the most of the1r unexpected opportumty 
The issue of the Emperor was qmetly taken care of by persuading 
Foreign Secretary Bevm and the new cabmet that any movement to 
arrest and try Hirohito would be an invitation to anarchy. Whitehall and 
the government were quick to argue m the defense of their action and 
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calculated correctly that the British public had other and more 
immediate problems to tackle The prompt and outwardly deferential 
response of the Japanese people to the beginnings of the occupation 
and the impression that the Emperor himself gave to General 
MacArthur at their first meeting on 27 September 1945 added evidence 
to support the diplomats’views. There were no serious incidents 
ag剖nstAllied troops and the political system of lmpenal Japan was 
torn up Much, at least on the surface, did change, including the role 
of the Japanese monarchy. 
The British government’s support for the retention of a modified 
lmpenal system may well have been behind the extraordinary message 
that the Emperor conveyed through Sir George Sansom to Buckingham 
Palace in the wmter of 1946 In this statement the Emperor made a 
rare, and possibly umque, series of remarks. He said: 
'I did my utmost to avoid war. Thmgs, however, came to 
such a pass for reasons of internal affairs that we very 
reluctantly opened hostilities against your country, with 
which Japan had long maintained most friendly relat10ns 
ever since the time of the Emperor MeiJi, and where, during 
my memorable visit, I was given a most cordial reception by 
the Royal House, the pleasant recollections of which I have 
always chenshed. It 1s a matter for sincere regret that you 
should have suffered from great loss of hie and property 
caused by this war. 
I signed my name to the Declaration of War with heart 
rending grief, repeatedly telling General Tojo, the then prime 
Minister, that, while recalling the memones of my happy 
days m England, I should be obliged to do that with much 
regret and reluctance. 
I earnestly desire to carry out the terms of the Potsdam 
declaration faithfully, and to make every effort to rebuild a 
better nation dedicated to peace and democracy I cannot 
but hope sincerely that we shall be able to regam the 
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diplomatic relations between our respective countries on 
some future date and restore our friendship of the past. 
I take this opportunity of expr田singmy good wishes for 
the welfare of the Royal House as well as for the prosperity 
of the British people. ’目的
The Emperor’s message was a rare glimpse of the Emperor’s own 
thinking. Unfortunately for the Bntish government it was unable to 
regain some of the mfluence 1t had once possessed in Japan through its 
Court contacts. MacArthur insisted that al non-American links to the 
Emperor be closely monitored and this discouragement, coupled with 
the reemergence of the dreary protocol-conscious ways of the recent 
past, left London with few tangible rewards for its efforts to uphold 
the Japanese monarchy. The lmpenal mst1tullon, after a few years of 
relative hberalism durmg the Allied occupation, returned to its roots and 
gradually discarded what were increasingly viewed by the Imperial 
Household Agency as alien accretions. 
Public attention on the monarchy only resurfaced with news of the 
Emperor’S illness m 1988. Bntish newspapers then began publishmg a 
series of robust attacks on the person of the Emperor, suggesting that 
he shared culpability for the outbreak of the Pacific War and for the 
maltreatment of POWs and 口vilianinternees. This m its most strident 
form was the speciality of the British tabloid press but it would be 
inaccurate to assume that readers of other newspapers were of any 
very different persuasion over the role of the Emperor during the war 
What is apparent from this media bhtz on the dymg Emperor is the 
extraordinanly bitter emot10ns that resurfaced. The vehemence of 
British opinion m 1988-89 is a reflection of the weaknesses of popular 
knowledge of Japanese history, which inevitably played into the hands 
of the more sensational editors, and an undercurrent of resentment at 
post-war Japan’s remarkable economic accomplishments. The contrast 
between the reversal m fortunes of Bntam and Japan undoubtedly 
contnbuted to the bout of Emperor “bashing”Japan’s reemergence as 
a great power by 1990 was to a considerable degree at the expense of 
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Britain’S position m the Asian Pacific region and had senously 
jeopardized London’s claims to any “special relationship" with 
Washington. Japan’s nse paralleled Bntam’s declme. 
The long terminal illness of the Emperor was a last attempt to rake 
over the coals. It gave comfort to many groups m British society, 
however much Bntam’s former ambassador Str Hugh Cortazz1 might 
complam to The Times over the 'unchristian and unworthy' nature of 
such attacks in the media."" The Japanese government made formal 
protest to London over the suggest10n of the Emperor’s cnmmality and 
the wish of some Fleet Street papers that he 'rot in hel，間 Butthere 
was litle any outsider could do to staunch the woundmg stones 
Japanese government spokesmen might complain and leadmg 
polit1c1ans, such as Watanabe Michio, then chatrman of the Liberal 
Democratic Party’s Executive Board, cal for legal act旧民 yet the 
problem was essentially a British one The defming of the Emperor as 
'the smkmg son of evil' and an 'evil monster’suggested that much of 
the oficial rhetonc of Anglo-Japanese cordiality had been counter-
productive and in disregard of popular doubts within Britain. Such 
sentiments, which had a similar resonance in Korea and southeast 
Asia, should act as a cautionary break against assummg that the recent 
past can be written off as history and consigned to the archives. 間
The queslton that remams, however, to be answered 1s why the 
news of the Emperor’S illness led to far greater pubhc hostility withm 
British society m 1989 than it did when the Emperor and indeed the 
whole of the Japanese Empire was at the Allies' mercy m 1945. The 
Thatcher government was sufftciently concerned by this sudden swell 
of anti-Japanese sentiment to reconsider the names of those that the 
cabinet would send to Tokyo for the Emperor’s funeral In 1945 the 
Foreign Offtce had been able to give the lead to the government this 
does not appear to have been the case in 1989; similarly the role of 
public opmion was unquesltonably stronger m 1988 8日thanin 1945. 
Any hypothesis on the Emperor requtres both long term and more 
immediate factors to be taken into consideration. The end of the 
Pacific war had resulted m simply too many greater issues for Bntain 
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to be able to concentrate on a nation that had to be (however 
reluctantly) recognized as within the American sphere of influence Yet 
by the time of the San Francisco peace conference in September 1951 
there were already senous doubts over the validity of the Labour 
government’s relatively mild approach to post-war Japan. Public 
interest focussed on the lack of restrictions placed on Japan’s 
commercial and industrial rehabilitat10n. Demands for a less generous 
peace and a greater attention on how Bntish industry would be able to 
compete with its Japanese counterparts were growing apace.附 There
was also a half-hidden undercurrent of anxiety that Britain was about 
to surrender its remaining claims to bemg a Pacific power as the 
United States imposed its own security arrangements on both Japan 
and Commonwealth governments. The signmg of the ANZUS pact 
(without any even subsidiary role for Britain) spelt out al too clearly 
the fact that the Pacific was an exclusively American lake. 
British commentary on Japan m the postwar decades clearly had 
economic and political misg1vmgs at its core. The Emperor’s illness in 
1988 was then used as an opportunity to regroup much of the dormant 
anti-Japanese feeling that had rarely been confronted m the years from 
San Francisco to the 1980s The Emperor was attacked for supposedly 
leading his nation to war, for bemg so successful in the imtial months 
of hostihties and, above al else in the popular mind, for permitting the 
maltreatment of British prisoners. Sansom had accurately warned his 
Japanese contacts m January 1946 that British・opmionwas stil very 
bitter by reason of Japanese atrocities, and that the Japanese Army had 
perhaps done more damage to Japan by their cruelties than by losing 
the war.刊＂＇ Very httle had apparently changed in the intervening two 
generations to remove this British resentment A succession of 
pubhcattons of both a serious and sensat10nal nature had done thetr 
best to keep the hornble subject fresh and to introduce the topic to 
those who had had no ftrst hand expenence of the second world 
war."0 The Emperor and the black side of Japanese imperiahsm would 
remain indelibly linked in the Bntish mind. 
The bitterness of many in Bntam to the Japan of their memones 
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should not be mterpreted as entirely an exercise m spite and 
recrimination There may possibly be two particles of hope among al 
the dross. Firstly, the criticism of Japan was a head of steam that has 
seemingly been finally let of. It 1s hkely that the Bntish perception of 
Japan is in the process of change following the death of the Emperor 
Mrs Thatcher, who took note of British anger to the extent of making 
certam that the itmerary of the Duke of Edinburgh was altered to 
permit a visit to the Commonwealth war cemetry immediately after the 
Bntish party had attended the Emperor’s funeral, clearly wishes to 
reconstruct the relatmnsh1p. She 1s particularly eager to encourage 
Japanese inward investment and employs the prospect of greater 
European economic umty after 1992 as a weapon to this end In return 
Britain is attemptmg to offer a greater mternahonal v1s1on to Japan, 
something that during the Gulf crisis 1s not to the hking of much of 
the Japanese electorate, and 1s pressmg for a Euro Japanese partnership 
to offset the明Tashington-Tokyoaxis"" 
If the press barrage agamst the Emperor may be seen as not without 
its therapeullc side for Britain, perhaps the same might also be claimed 
for Japan The vehemence of the British criticism was an undoubted 
surprise to the Japanese pubhc, where the entire subJect of Imperial 
responsibility or involvement in the Pacific War remams strictly taboo. 
To suggest that the late Emperor might have had even some slight 
involvement m the decision to go to war or to delay the surrender 
process is to risk physical injury"" For the Japanese people to have to 
listen to overseas views that contradicted their own received wisdom 
(albeit m a hysterical form) should be of value Sooner or later the 
Emperor wil have to be brought out of the closet and it is not going 
to be an entirely pamless exercise either for the Court’s mmmns or the 
people of Japan. The Emperor question that the British so unceremo 
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天皇論争（再燃？）
一日英関係， 1945～1989年一
〈要約〉
ロジャー・パックレー
太平洋戦争終戦時，英国の政府及び外務省は圏内の反対意見グループ
からの強い圧力にもかかわらず，一貫して天皇を救うという姿勢を崩さ
なかった。
しかしながら， 1988年， 89年には英国に於いて反日感情が非常に高
まったのも事実である。
本稿は日本の敗戦降伏から約45年経過した1980年代末期に，なぜ英国
民の日本批判 天皇及び政治経済に対して が激化したかを考察L,
論じたものである。
昭和天皇の死により，日英関係はまた新しい前進へと一歩を踏み出し
た。
